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I. Introduction 
Over the course of the past 15 years, programs commonly referred to as Conditional Cash 
Transfer programs (CCTs), have become increasingly widespread in Latin American countries, 
with nations as far reaching as Guatemala, Mexico, and Chile each implementing their own 
versions of these programs. CCT programs first appeared in Latin America in 1997, when 
Mexico implemented a national program then known as ‘Progresa’ (later changed to 
Oportunidades and Prospera). It was not until 2003, however, when the Brazilian government 
under Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva created another national CCT program, Bolsa Familia, that these 
programs began to see widespread implementation within the region. Soon after its 
implementation, Bolsa Familia received widespread national support, and, as a result, other Latin 
American governments began to implement similar programs.  
Conditional Cash Transfer programs aim to assist families living in poverty by providing 
them with some additional income provided that they meet certain conditions. These conditions 
involve doing something that the governments of these countries believe provides a societal 
benefit. Common requirements include sending your children to school, having them vaccinated 
and making sure that they are receiving proper medical care.  
As a result, governments who implement these programs often advertise that these 
programs simultaneously combat high rates of poverty and other issues that they view as societal 
problems, such as low school attendance or vaccination rates. These requirements also allow 
CCT programs to be seen as more than just simple government handouts to the poor, which help 
them garner even more support among the public and make them more palatable to impoverished 
individuals in these countries who would be otherwise averse to accepting what they see as 
unearned benefits. 
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As result of their widespread support among Latin American countries, study of CCT 
programs is critical in understanding not only the economic but also the political development of 
Latin American countries in the future. For economists, it is crucial to understand exactly how 
these programs actually affect poverty rates in the countries in which they are implemented if 
they are to be used as a model for other developing countries struggling with high rates of 
poverty. For political scientists, it is important to understand the potential political implications 
that the implementation of these massive programs may have for those in power, and how these 
programs could be designed in such a way that minimizes their negative impact on the political 
sphere. 
Fortunately, there has been significant study into whether or not CCT programs 
significantly aid individuals living in poverty. So far, a significant portion of the literature 
suggests that, while not lifting these families out of poverty, CCT programs have been successful 
in reducing the depth of the poverty that these families experience by giving them enough money 
to meet their need for basic necessities such as food and medicine (Bithers-Terry, 2014). These 
positive economic reports have only encouraged even more countries to implement CCT 
programs and caused countries with their own CCT programs to further expand them. It has also 
allowed political figures within these countries who were responsible for the implementation 
these programs to run for re-election on the good press that they have received. 
Although the breadth of research is not as great as it has been in the case of the economic 
impact of these CCT programs, there has also been a fair amount of research done on how Latin 
American CCT programs can affect political systems on the federal level (Ansell and Mitchell, 
2012; Bucheli, 2015; Corrêa and Cheibub, 2016; Linos, 2013). This is because CCT programs 
are run at a federal level and national politicians are most prominently seen emphasizing their 
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implementation of CCT programs during their re-election campaigns. The research in this area 
seems to suggest that, at least on a national level, CCT programs have largely given a boost to 
incumbents in office due to the program’s recipients’ positive views and direct monetary benefit 
in this area (Grimes and Wängnerud, 2010; Seawall, 2008). Despite the fact that these programs 
provide an incumbency advantage to politicians already in power, however, there is little 
evidence that politicians themselves are manipulating the program in a way that would directly 
benefit them or their supporters, monetarily or otherwise. In fact, some countries with high rates 
of corruption in their federal governments that have implemented CCT programs have actually 
seen a very low level of corruption within these programs after they have been implemented. 
Corruption within these programs takes two basic forms: local corruption and federal 
corruption. Federal corruption is corruption that results from federal level employees tampering 
with program data and funds, and largely takes the form of fund misallocation and 
embezzlement. Local corruption results from local-level government officials tampering with 
program data. This form of corruption usually takes the form of manipulating locally gathered 
information so that select families can get on the program, or threatening local citizens with 
removal from the program if they do not give into certain demands. This is a topic of particularly 
great concern when one considers the fact that many of the countries in which these programs 
have been implemented have notoriously high rates of corruption within their own federal 
programs. One may believe that, due to the massive scope of these social programs, some 
individuals might see them as a target for manipulation and use the program for their own 
purposes. 
In spite of this fact, overall these social programs have seen relatively low rates of 
corruption when compared with corruption rates in other social programs in the countries in 
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which they have been implemented. While corruption is still present to some extent within these 
programs, studies have shown that, overall, local and federal corruption within these programs 
still dwarfs the rates of corruption of other aspects of the government (Instituto Mexicano para la 
Competitividad, 2015). 
The low level of corruption within these massive social programs, when contrasted with 
the relatively high level of corruption in these countries’ federal governments, begs the question 
of how CCT programs have had significantly lower levels of corruption than the federal 
governments of the countries in which they have been implemented in. This paper hopes to 
answer this question by analyzing the ways in which CCT programs have been implemented in 
several countries and examining how their implementation could lead to a low level of 
corruption within these specific programs. 
Due to the popularity of these Conditional Cash Transfer programs and their increasing 
use among developing countries, it is incredibly important to analyze how they could be 
implemented so as to minimize corruption. It is particularly important to do so because many of 
the countries that have implemented or plan on implementing these programs are developing 
countries who have had a history of struggling with corruption in the past. 
 
II. Literature Review 
In the past two decades, conditional cash transfer programs, also known as CCTs, have 
become a staple of Latin American social programs. Fenwick (2013) noted that CCT programs 
are supported by a broad international consensus. Many governments outside of Latin America 
believe that CCT programs have been largely successful at accomplishing their stated goal of 
bettering the lives of the impoverished while promoting goals like higher education rates and 
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better health. Natasha Sugiyama (2011) notes in her report that the widespread implementation 
of CCT programs over a relatively short period of time came in part as a result of their 
widespread support and popularity in the Latin American countries that adopted them. As a 
result, leaders of neighboring countries feel pressure not only from neighboring leaders but also 
their own citizens to adopt a program that, by and large, seems to be a resounding success in the 
places where it has been implemented. 
 When running a study that looks at the political impact of CCT programs, it is also 
important to consider their economic impact, as economic changes can influence people’s 
political views on these programs. Since the rise of these CCT programs in Latin America, 
political scientists have extensively researched these programs’ economic impact. Many studies 
have concluded that economically, CCT programs have improved the quality of life for those 
living in poverty, giving them greater access to necessary resources such as food and medicine 
(Bither-Terry, 2012; Wetzel, 2013). While political scientists have been able to calculate these 
short term benefits of CCT programs, research on the long term economic benefits or 
disadvantages of these programs, such as whether or not the children of the beneficiaries of these 
programs go on to be more successful in the future, has been inconclusive. 
 Political scientists have also researched how CCT programs have affected the political 
systems of Latin American countries. The literature by and large agrees that these types of 
programs have been able to have an impact on political systems on a national level. So far, many 
sources have claimed that a CCT program in Brazil, Bolsa Familia, gives a kind of incumbency 
advantage at a Federal level. Research by Juan Bucheli (2015) concluded that CCT programs 
provided a significant advantage to incumbents, as these programs not only caused greater voter 
turnout among beneficiaries of the program, but also led more voters to defect to the incumbent 
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candidate after a CCT program’s implementation. By contrast, Diego Correa (2015) has 
countered that this incumbency advantage is not as significant as previous studies have indicated. 
He referred specifically to the idea that this advantage is offset by voters who do not like CCT 
programs and vote against incumbents as well as the fact that voters only vote based on the 
success of a CCT if the rest of the nation’s national economy is doing well. 
 There has also been research on whether or not politicians actively use CCT programs in 
order to influence votes. So far, it appears as though the extent to which someone will 
manipulate these programs to fit a political agenda differs from country to country. For example, 
Mexico’s Progresa program seems to have remained fairly consistent since its inception and has 
not shown significant signs of manipulation throughout its existence (Seawall, 2008). 
 Brazil’s CCT program, Bolsa Familia, shows little to no manipulation in its targeting of 
citizens (Fried, 2012) , but the program itself has been expanded and changed during election 
years in what many people believe is an attempt to influence voters. Furthermore, some have 
pointed to the fact that the Brazilian government has not increased funding to its schools and 
medical services as a sign that Bolsa Familia is mainly being used as a populist tool rather than 
an attempt to actually better the lives of the poor. Since two of the requirements to receive 
money from the Bolsa Familia program is to ensure that all your children go to school and are 
vaccinated, the government should have expected an increased burden on its education and 
medical systems as more and more families try to meet these requirements. Even as more and 
more children have gone to school as a result of the program, the Brazilian government has 
failed to allocate more funds to its school system to meet this increased demand. This has 
resulted in overcrowded classrooms and a poor learning environment for these children. The 
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failure of the Brazilian government to adequately supply these funds has led some to accuse 
political leaders of only using the program for political gain (Sewall, 2008). 
 Although extensive research has examined the impacts CCT programs have on elections 
at a federal level, there is a gap in the research when it comes to the local level. Ansell and 
Mitchell (2011) have speculated that these programs decrease the amount of influence that local 
politicians have, which decreases their ability to carry out corrupt and clientelistic practices. 
Specifically, Ansell and Mitchell state that local governments have very little say in the 
implementation of these programs as a result of the fact that the vast majority of the 
implementation of this program is left up to the federal government. The federal government is 
in charge of who receives money from CCT programs and ensures that they receive these funds. 
As a result, local politicians are left with very little say in how to distribute the program’s funds 
to their constituents. In addition to this lack of say in the actual process, the fact that those living 
in poverty have more money means that they are less likely to be influenced by vote buying 
practices. In another paper, Grimes and Wängnerud (2010) speculated that the implementation of 
these CCT programs leads individuals to be less swayed by clientelistic practices on a local level. 
As a result, the amount of corruption in local governments would decrease in countries with a 
CCT program in place. 
 A large part of this decrease in corruption can be attributed to how little CCT programs 
appear to be influenced by political motivations when the programs are put into practice. In spite 
of the fact that some politicians may use these programs to curry favor during election season, 
the programs themselves seem to be running effectively when targeting impoverished areas. 
Brian Fried (2012) notes that Bolsa Familia is apolitical in the way that they hand out benefits to 
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different areas, in spite of the fact that some of the governments in charge of the program are 
known for corruption on the federal level. 
While much of the literature provides interesting and logical reasons for why CCT 
programs have an effect on lower corruption levels in the countries in which they have been 
implemented, not much research has focused on how these massive social programs have been 
able to largely avoid corruption themselves. 
Research into CCTs in several countries by anti-corruption organizations have shown that 
these programs have been fairly free of corruption. So far, CCT programs have been largely 
apolitical in terms of who they target. In spite of the fact that some politicians may use the 
success of the program to bolster their re-election chances, the way in which the program itself 
delivers funds does not appear to be based on any political motivations or personal gains (Fried, 
2012 and Grimes & Wängnerud, 2010). 
What is surprising about this lack of corruption is that these organizations are able to 
exist in countries that have notoriously high levels of corruption within the federal government. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which scores countries’ levels of 
corruption on a scale from 1 (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean), gave Mexico a score of only 35 
and Brazil a score of 38. Global Intergrity, another organization that monitors corruption, gave 
Mexico a rating of 681 out of 100 in their 2011 report. Brazil received an overall score of 78, 
which, while noticeably higher than Mexico’s, still places it in the middle of the pack with regard 
to all other countries in the world. 
                                                          
1 Since Transparency International and Global Integrity are two separate organizations, their scale for measuring 
corruption varies. Global Integrity tends to score countries higher overall in their barometer. Thus, while a 68 out 
of 100 would be a moderate score on Transparency International’s Scale, it qualifies as one of the weaker scores 
for Global Integrity. 
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These levels of corruption have also been shown to extend to these countries’ social 
programs. According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report, within the specific subcategories of 
‘Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances’ and ‘Public 
Administration and Professionalism’, Mexico scored 59 and 61 respectively. Both of these scores 
are considered by the index to be ‘Very Weak’. Brazil received higher scores in Global 
Integrity’s 2009 report, with scores of 78 and 72 in the categories of ‘Government 
Accountability’ and ‘Administration and Civil Service’ respectively, but even these scores only 
fall into the ‘moderate’ category at best. This level of corruption is reflected in the way that these 
governments control federal funding. It is currently estimated that the Brazilian government 
misappropriates 57.5 billion dollars in funding every year (Almeda, 2012). In Mexico, certain 
industries held such control over the government that many subsidies that were supposed to 
assist the poor had such stringent guidelines that they forced impoverished people to only buy 
goods from these same industries in order to receive any benefits (Levy, 2006).  
The unexplained difference between the level of corruption in these countries’ federal 
governments and these same government’s CCT programs leaves a gap in the research that I 
hope to fill with my research question. Specifically, I plan on investigating why CCT programs 
in nations like Mexico and Brazil have been able to by and large avoid corrupt practices even 
though the governments in charge of them are notorious for doling out political favors to gain 
influence. Research on how these socials programs are able to avoid corruption could be 
extremely helpful to policymakers looking to create future social programs in nations that have 
historically had trouble with corruption in the implementation of their programs. 
 
III. Theory: 
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The goal of this thesis paper will be to explain exactly how conditional cash transfer 
programs in certain countries are able to avoid the levels of corruption that appear in other 
federal programs within these same countries. In order to do this, I will examine the 
administrative mechanisms that are in place to prevent corruption, as well as some of the exterior 
forces that are at play in encouraging this low level of corruption. 
One factor that I will be examining is how centralized the program is. The degree of 
control that the central government has over the program, how the rewards of the program are 
administered, who collects the data used to determine who qualifies under the program, and how 
much independence the program has from the central government would be factors that qualify 
under this topic. 
Traditionally, social programs which have been issued by the federal government in Latin 
American countries have been administered by local governments on a local level. While this 
makes task delegation easier, it has also been shown to lead to higher levels of corruption within 
these social programs. This is because corruption in Latin American countries are largely based 
off of clientelistic politics, wherein a corrupt government official offers to give some form of 
social aid in return for political support (Grimes and Wängnerud, 2010). Thus, giving control of 
administration over to local governments allows them to more directly impact the flow of 
benefits and more easily implement a system of clientelism within the scope of a program. 
Conversely, having a more centralized program in which benefits are determined and given out 
by the federal government make it more difficult for local politicians to manipulate the system in 
a way that benefits them. As a result, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: More centralized CCT programs experience lower levels of clientelism-based 
corruption than less centralized programs. 
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In addition, the overall transparency of the program should play a crucial role in 
preventing corruption from spreading to the program. Administrators and governments in charge 
of running conditional cash transfer programs have several methods of making sure that their 
programs are transparent. 
The most straightforward way to promote transparency within the program would be to 
publish all the data received about families who qualify for CCT programs in order to allow 
anyone to evaluate whether or not the families who qualify for the program should qualify. This 
would be difficult for many countries to implement, however, as many of those who receive 
benefits from CCT programs want to protect their anonymity and personal information. Opening 
this data up to the public may encourage these families to either not participate in the program or 
give false information about their lives. Both of these options would hurt the program’s ability to 
accurately reach all those it should cover, and as a result is not utilized in the countries who have 
implemented CCT programs (Levy, 2006). 
Barring this option, there are still several ways in which anti-corruption and government 
accountability groups could monitor these programs to decrease the risk of corruption. For 
example, the government could allow government accountability groups to access the raw data 
for personal reports while only publishing general statistics about the program and anonymous 
data to the public at large. Another way of allowing greater transparency would be to allow the 
public to see exactly what the formula is for determining who does and does not qualify for a 
CCT program. 
All in all, allowing greater transparency for CCT programs make it more likely that a 
politician or bureaucrat attempting to manipulate the program for their own personal benefit 
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would be more likely to get caught.  Since getting caught manipulating these programs would 
result in punishment from other groups, corrupt politicians should try to avoid manipulating 
programs where the risk of getting caught is higher. Thus, having greater transparency within a 
social program like a CCT should decrease the odds of corruption spreading to that program. 
H2: The more transparent a CCT program is, the less likely it is that corruption will 
occur. 
 
Another factor that I will be examining for my thesis is the criteria that the government 
uses to determine who should receive benefits from the program. This includes both how the 
government determines which people qualify for money under the program as well as how those 
running the program determine how much money an individual family should receive. What I 
will be looking for under this topic is the objectivity of the criteria used to qualify for conditional 
cash transfer programs within these countries are. Traditionally, social programs in Latin 
America could have fairly loose standards for determining who qualifies and who does not 
(Levy, 2006 and Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2006). If one uses objective criteria in 
determining who should qualify for the program, such as income level, number of working 
family members in the house, value of local property and assets, these programs should be much 
more difficult to manipulate in a way that would favor a local politician’s patrons over those who 
do not support that politician. 
It can also be difficult to evaluate the overall assets and purchasing power of lower 
income families without having objective criteria in place. Due to the fact that different areas can 
have differing average prices and income levels, a family making a bit more money in one 
province may not necessarily be better off than a family making a little less money in another. In 
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addition, the evaluators themselves may have differing ideas on how much different assets are 
worth when comparing them to the family’s current income. Evaluators also may have to take 
into account the idea that families may be hiding some of their assets from them in order to get 
on the program. The objective criteria in place to measure how much a family can alleviate some 
of the subjectivity that arises from these problems, and make it more difficult for evaluators to 
influence the process by only supplying their subjective analysis. 
On the other hand, having specific objective criteria in mind also makes administration of 
the program more difficult, as program administrators will have to be more reliant on lower level 
data collection members to collect data that accurately reflects the status of poorer families 
(Levy, 2006). Despite this potential flaw, however, I expect that having strict and objective 
measures to determine who qualifies under the program to make it much more difficult for 
people to manipulate the program for their own benefit. 
H3: Using objective criteria such as income level, value of assets, and number of 
family members living in the home to determine who qualifies for a social program makes 
it less likely for corruption to occur within that program. 
 
 
IV. Methods: 
 In this section I will explain the method I will use to evaluate the way in which 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs are designed as well as how these differences in these 
programs affect the degree of corruption seen in them. As mentioned in my theory section, I will 
examine 3 different aspects of these programs and then evaluate their potential impact at 
lowering corruption within the program. These aspects will be the level of centralization of the 
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program, the objective criteria that the program uses when determining who should receive 
benefits, the level of transparency within the program, the ability of outside groups to monitor 
the program. 
 In order to do this, I will have to review material related to the way in which these 
programs are organized and operated. This includes the legislation used to create these programs 
and dictate how they are run as well as policy papers written by those familiar with the program 
that explain how these programs are operated on a daily basis. There is some degree of concern 
that because these sources are so close to those running CCT programs, relying on only these 
sources may result in my conclusions having a more favorable bias towards these programs. That 
is why I will also review papers written by external organizations that evaluate these programs in 
order to ensure that I will also receive the perspective of a more unbiased outsider. Some of these 
organizations are explicitly asked to look for weaknesses, flaws, and signs of corruption in the 
program. This means that these sources will include the more negative aspects of these programs, 
which, when combined with other policy papers, will hopefully give me a more neutral view. 
 After reviewing these sources, I will have to categorize the CCT programs of each 
country I am reviewing in each of the 3 categories that I am reviewing. Although I recognize that 
each of these categories fall on a scale of strength or weakness rather than checking off a simple 
box ‘yes’ or ‘no’, I do not plan on assigning them a score when I review them. This is due to the 
fact that the categories that fairly subjective. For example, there is still much debate in the 
political science community about what makes some practices more transparent that others and 
what constitutes fair and objective criteria when evaluating how a family lives. As result, while I 
feel comfortable comparing how these programs are run compared to one another and making a 
conclusion, I would not feel comfortable scoring them on these circumstances. 
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 One aspect of these programs that will be fairly hard to measure is the degree to which 
corruption within these programs are affected by the way that they are implemented. In many 
cases, it may be difficult to determine whether or not corruption was decreased due to one factor, 
another factor, or a mixture of the two. It is for this reason that I will be using a qualitative 
method to evaluate how these measures decrease, increase, or do not affect the level of 
corruption within these programs. On top of assessing the degree of corruption within these 
programs, I will also look at the types of corruption present within these programs or lack thereof 
and see how they could be related to the different strategies that these programs implemented. 
This means that I will have to rely on previous research on how certain types of corruption form 
in other social programs, as well as conclusions from independent anti-corruption groups on how 
certain implementation strategies affect corruption within the program. 
 To assess the degree of corruption within these programs, I will have to rely on several 
external sources. These will largely include the aforementioned external groups that watch these 
programs and evaluate them on a regular basis. In addition, I will also have to rely on news 
organizations within the country who would report on instances of corruption within these 
programs. While I realize that this method of evaluating corruption is imperfect and will not be 
able to detect all corruption, I believe that it is the most reliable way to assess the level of 
corruption that occurs within these specific programs. This also means that my paper and 
conclusions will be more focused on systemic federal rather than local corruption, as these types 
are more likely to be consistently reported on by newspapers and noticed by the independent 
groups analyzing these CCT programs. 
a. Case Study Choices 
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 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on two specific cases: Brazil’s CCT program, 
Bolsa Familia, and Mexico’s CCT program, Prospera (formerly Oportunidades). I have decided 
to choose these two countries’ programs for a multitude of reasons.  
The first is that these programs are two of the longest running program in Latin America. 
Although the program known as ‘Prospera’ only officially came into existence in 2015, Mexico’s 
national CCT program has existed for almost two decades under the names ‘Progresa’ (from 
1997-2002) and Oportunidades (from 2002-2014). Brazil’s CCT program, Bolsa Familia, was 
created under then President Inacio Lula de Silva in 2003, but was based on a provincial program 
known as Bolsa Escola that had been operating for several years prior. The long duration of these 
programs allows them to serve as examples of CCTs that have by and large been able to avoid a 
significant degree of corruption for a fairly large period of time. As a result, it will be extremely 
useful to me and other political scientists to analyze exactly what methods it was able to use in 
order to do so, as they may point to a way in which other social programs in developing 
countries will be able to avoid significant corruption in the long term.  
I have also chosen these programs due to their size in comparison to other social 
programs. Bolsa Familia is currently one of if not the largest social program in the world, 
currently providing benefits to around 51 million people within the country (World Bank, 2013). 
Mexico’s CCT program, while not as large as Brazil’s is still the largest social program in the 
country and provides benefits to 30 million people in Mexico (World Bank, 2014). It will be 
helpful to examine these larger programs because larger social programs tend to be more difficult 
to administrate than smaller ones, and as a result are more susceptible to corruption. As a result, 
information on how large social programs like Bolsa Familia or Prospera managed to avoid 
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corruption would be very useful to individuals looking to decrease corruption within their own 
social programs. 
Finally, I choose both of these countries as cases to examine because of the differences 
between their respective programs. Although Bolsa Familia and Prospera are similar in that they 
are CCT programs cover a large portion of the population and have existed for a long time, they 
still have critical differences in the way in which they are organized. For example, Bolsa Familia 
is significantly less centralized than Prospera in critical areas such as data collection and delivery 
of benefits. In addition, both programs have some differences in in the criteria they use to 
determine who receives benefits and the amount that they should receive. Thus, they provide 
enough of a contrast for me to run a comparative study such as this in order to determine which 
organization options lead to a lower level of corruption. 
 
V. Analysis 
a. Centralization 
 The differences in centralization between Prospera program and Bolsa Familia likely 
stem from the different ways in which they were created.The Prospera program was spearheaded 
by Santiago Levy, then Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico. 
Levy (2006) writes that the goal of the program was to replace food subsidies that were then 
expected to assist the poor in buying food and other supplies. Levy saw these subsidies as fairly 
wasteful, as they limited what the poor could buy while providing a large benefit to the 
producers of the goods that were subsidized. As a result, he helped create the Progresa program, 
which would provide poor families who met certain requirements with money. Levy theorized 
that since providing poor families with money gives them greater flexibility in what they could 
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buy, these families would be able to buy exactly what was needed and would be more likely to 
buy local goods, which would provide benefits to both these poor families and the local 
economy. 
 Due to the fact that Progresa replaced government issued subsidies and was spearheaded 
by a combination of different federal agencies, the CCT program took on a very centralized role. 
The guidelines for who receives benefits from the program on a province by province basis are 
ultimately determined by the federal government. The individuals who collect data from families 
and the officials that determine whether they qualify are also employed by the federal 
government. In addition, the benefits themselves are doled out in packages provided by the 
federal government. Due to the way that this program is organized, local governments have 
essentially no impact on the way that Prospera operates. This has resulted in a very centralized 
program (Levy, 2006 and Grimes and Wängnerud, 2010). 
 Bolsa Familia, on the other hand, is based on a provincial program known as Bolsa 
Escola. This program initially operated in only a few provinces, and thus these provincial 
governments had the majority of control over how these programs were run. Due to these 
programs’ local successes in benefitting the poor and encouraging local children to go to classes, 
then Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva adopted these programs on a national scale 
(Bourguignon & Ferreira, 2003). 
 Due to the fact that Bolsa Familia’s design was based off of this provincial model, it is 
significantly less centralized than Prospera. While the federal government still sets up the 
national guidelines for who qualifies to receive benefits, municipal governments are in charge of 
actual data collection. In addition, while the money that these families receive still come from 
the federal government, the government itself is not in charge of handing them out. This money 
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is instead held by local banks, who are in charge of placing money into the accounts of families 
that receive these benefits and giving it to them when they present identification. The stated goal 
of this action is to encourage poorer families to be more familiar with banks to help link poor 
families with the country’s banking system, which the government believes leads to greater 
economic development overall (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, and Bénédicte, 2007). 
 The Brazilian government pursues this less centralized option because it costs the federal 
government less money overall. Passing tasks such as data collection and distribution of benefits 
onto other established local entities allows the government to take advantage of pre-established 
local networks rather than creating their own from the ground up and allows these institutions to 
cover most of the costs for these tasks (Lindert et al., 2007). 
 The Mexican system for organization of these programs has shown itself to be very 
effective at lowering the level of clientelism within local governments. Pursuant to research from 
Grimes and Wängnerud (2010), the perception of corruption on a local level has decreased since 
the implementation of a CCT program in Mexico. They theorize that this is because of the fact 
that these programs are so centralized. Prior to the implementation of a CCT program in Mexico, 
many impoverished individuals were reliant on the favor of local politicians to provide extra 
money and benefits to them. By replacing subsidies with an extremely centralized, federally run 
program, the Mexican government has effectively cut local politicians out of the equation 
entirely (Ansell and Mitchell, 2011). This makes it incredibly difficult if not impossible for 
corruption in this program to occur on a local level, which means that an investigation into 
corruption in Prospera only has to focus on the federal level. 
 Due to the fact that Bolsa Familia is not nearly as centralized as Prospera, it is much more 
susceptible to corruption on a local level. Local municipalities who are in charge of collecting 
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data would be able to manipulate their results to be more favorable to those who support them if 
left unchecked. However, the Brazilian government, recognizing this possibility, has put in place 
several checks to try and prevent this kind of fraud from occurring. 
 First, the Brazilian federal government runs regular, random audits of municipal data to 
ensure that the data they are receiving is correct. These auditors are sent directly from Brazil’s 
Ministry of Social Development (MDS), which means that they have no loyalty to these 
municipal governments and are more likely to report accurately on these results. In addition to 
doling out punishments to governments who fall below their standards, the federal government 
also rewards municipal governments whose data accurately reflects program recipients in their 
respective region by awarding them additional tax dollars for local projects. This provides extra 
incentive for these municipalities to provide accurate reports (Lindert, et al, 2007 and Hellmann, 
2015). 
 In addition to these audits, the federal government also investigates any irregularities that 
pop up within the reporting of a municipality’s results. For example, if an area reports 100% 
school attendance for all children in the program or reports an unusually high number of people 
that meet the program’s requirements, the government will send someone to confirm these 
results are accurate. Unfortunately, this system is unable to catch all irregularities due to the 
large aberration necessary to call attention to the error (Lindert et al., 2007). 
 Based on these evaluations, the Mexican CCT program is clearly much more centralized 
than the Brazilian CCT program. The Mexican Ministry for Social Development (SEDESOL) is 
not only in charge of creating the standards that the program uses, but also uses its own agents 
and resources for the data collection and evaluation processes. This leaves little to no room for 
local governments to influence the program, and makes it wholly centralized. The Brazilian 
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program, on the other hand, utilizes a much more decentralized method for both the collection of 
data as well as the distribution of benefits. While it attempts to offset some of the potential 
principal-agent problems that this level of decentralization could create with incentives and 
punishments, it still stands as a slightly more decentralized program in the way that it is 
organized. 
 The centralization of Prospera also appears to have lowered the amount of corruption 
used by local governments. Traditionally, the most typical method of corruption in Latin 
American counties has been through clientelism. Clientelism occurs when someone in 
government offers rewards to someone else in return for their support. In terms of CCT programs 
like Bolsa Familia or Oportunidades, it would occur when a local politician guarantees to place 
someone on the program who may not otherwise make it. In return, that person may offer their 
vote or some other form of support in a future election (Díaz-Cayeros et. al, 2012). 
 Outwardly, the implementation of Prospera in Mexico appears to have lowered the 
amount of clientelism on a local level in Mexico. According to research by Grimes and 
Wängnerud (2010), provinces have reported that the level of local corruption has decreased since 
the implementation of Oportunidades in their province. Part of this is due to the centralization of 
the program. Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) argue that impoverished families made up a significant 
portion of those who received support from politicians in a clientelistic system. This is largely 
due to the fact that because impoverished families have less money than others, they place a 
higher value on smaller amounts of money or resources. Thus, one is able to buy their support 
for less money than they would others. Since the vote of an impoverished person is worth no less 
than anyone else’s, this makes them one of the more cost effective ways to drum up support 
using clientelistic practices. 
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 A centralized program such as Prospera seems to have limited the ability of local 
politicians to use the program to influence others. Since this program is run solely by the federal 
government of Mexico, local politicians cannot claim to be able to provide cash from the 
program in exchange for other services. This prevents the common, clientelistic form of 
corruption that typically comes from local officials from ever occurring. This also has the side 
effect of giving impoverished individuals extra money so that they can support themselves. This 
in turn makes it more expensive for local politicians who use a system of clientelism to stay in 
power to continue to do so, and thus lowers corruption in other means as well. 
 Bolsa Familia experiences a significantly higher rate of local errors than the Mexican 
CCT program. As mentioned previously, the Brazilian government has put into place several 
mechanisms that attempt to prevent local forms of corruption within the program that may result 
from its decentralized nature. This has not, however, prevented locals with some degree of 
influence over the program from breaking the law by either embezzling funds, putting people on 
the program who do not deserve to be covered, or denying people who should be on the program 
from receiving coverage (Lindert et al., 2007). 
 A recent survey conducted by the Brazilian Attorney general’s office estimated that, from 
2013-2014, Bolsa Familia lost about 2.5 billion dollars due to fraud abuse from families using 
the program. While this fraud includes individuals who were likely acting alone and trying to 
claim extra funds by saying that they either had extra family members or fell below certain levels 
of poverty, a significant amount was linked to local politicians helping others get on the program 
(Senhor, 2016). These families included not only donors and assistants to local political leaders, 
but also local politicians themselves who should clearly not qualify for the program. While this 
type of fraud is relatively uncommon within the program, accounting for less than 10% of 
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families, it is a clear indication that the processes that the Brazilian government put in place have 
not completely eliminated the potential for local political figures to influence the program for 
their own usage. 
 It should be noted that issues with centralization will primarily be associated with issues 
of local corruption. It appears as though that, when dealing with a social program such as Bolsa 
Familia or Prospera, increasing the level of centralization will decrease the level of local 
corruption. It should also be noted that a country can also provide incentives for local 
governments to carry out their duties faithfully to try and prevent them from abusing their 
authority, but even these measures will not eliminate local corruption entirely. Centralizing these 
programs appears to have a much greater impact on lowering the rates of local corruption. 
 Even so, the Brazilian government has taken steps to even further minimize the rates of 
local corruption within the country by educating citizens about how centralized the program is. 
Bolsa Familia recepients are given pamphlets and information about how the program is 
federally run and organized even though they are meeting with local officials. Additional signs 
that the true power behind the program is federally run comes from the national governmental 
seals that are on the cards given to program beneficiaries and announcements by federal 
politicians in which they claim credit for the program. This makes it significantly harder for local 
officials to claim that they have the authority to grant or revoke access to the program, and thus 
use the program as leverage for clientelistic purposes. These measures seem to be at least 
moderately effective, as surveys by Sugiyama and Hunter (2013) demonstrated that beneficiaries 
of the program who had experienced clientelism from local politicians rarely saw Bolsa Familia 
benefits used as a bargaining chip, as everyone had at least enough knowledge of the program to 
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know it was federally run and thus believed that they would not be able to impact their ability to 
receive benefits. 
 Overall corruption within these programs seems to be more focused on the local level, 
where there has been prior documentation of local officials improperly placing people on the 
beneficiary payroll who do not meet the criteria. Other types of corruption that could only be 
accomplished from the federal level, such as embezzlement of funds from the program or 
improperly changing the scope of beneficiaries from an entire province either occurs with much 
less frequency or is much harder to catch. 
 Interestingly enough, it may be possible for a more centralized program to lead to higher 
rates of corruption depending on how the federal government had designed the program prior. 
Although not discussed at large in this paper, the Guatemalan CCT program is more centralized 
in its targeting, much like the Mexican program, but also suffers from severe rates of corruption 
(Sandberg, 2015). However, these high rates of corruption stem from the fact that the program is 
not very transparent and the government in power frequently flagrantly changes the design of the 
program to benefit certain political groups (Tally and Fredholm, 2011). The program’s 
centralization exacerbates this effect by allowing the federal government greater control over the 
selection of beneficiaries over the program’s beneficiary list and overall design. Thus, one can 
see that while greater centralization can lead to lowered corruption levels, it can also lead to a 
greater level of corruption if the government that designs the program wishes to use it for 
corruption. 
 
b. Transparency: 
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 Both the Brazilian and Mexican governments have mechanisms in place to promote 
transparency within their programs. Although the degree to which each respective program is 
transparent varies, both attempt to accomplish this goal through similar means. The methods 
which these programs use to promote transparency include publication of program data and 
internal audits by both government and 3rd party organizations (Levy, 2006 and Hellmann, 
2015). 
 Both of these countries also have independent organizations that monitor their CCT 
programs in order to increase the chances that someone using the system to their own benefit 
would be caught. In Brazil, third party organizations are frequently brought in to inspect the 
program and ensure that the money allocated to the program is used according to the stated goals 
of the program. Organizations like El Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional 
(CEDEPLAR) and The World Bank run regular audits of the program that are able to examine 
the beneficiaries of the program to make sure that they actually qualify. In addition, these third 
party organizations are also tasked with examining the organization and structure of the program 
itself, and are advised to make critiques of the program’s structure so the program itself can be 
improved. 
 Another way that the Brazilian government attempts to promote transparency within the 
program is by having the banks distribute payments. The Brazilian government believes that, as 
an independent third party, banks could act as another independent evaluator of the program. 
Thus, by giving local banks the money that needs to be distributed by the program, these banks 
can check on and evaluate the distribution of funds. It is hoped that if they notice any 
irregularities in the way that money should be distributed, they will report on them (Lindert et 
al., 2007). 
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 In addition to these third party organizations, Brazil encourages citizens to check up on 
each other by releasing the names of beneficiaries of the program to people within each 
municipality. The government believes that they do not have enough time and resources to 
ensure that all 50 million beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia actually qualify for the program. As a 
result, they encourage other citizens to look to see if they recognize anyone on the list of names 
who they believe should not qualify. If a citizens spots an irregularity, then they are told to report 
it to their local Bolsa Familia Program coordinator to have it further investigated (Lindert et al., 
2007). While this lack of privacy and encouragement of citizen-reporting may be appalling to 
some, it is consistent with Bolsa Familia’s implementation as a decentralized program that relies 
on the use of local individuals to supplement costs that the federal government would otherwise 
have to incur. 
 Although the Mexican government does not publish all data to their citizens, they still 
release a large portion of it to the general public in an attempt to promote transparency. The 
Mexican government believes that publishing data on all individuals in a program would not 
leave enough privacy for those on the program. They also worry that, if data on who is in a 
program is published, then families who may be too proud to be seen publicly receiving aid from 
the government will refuse assistance (Levy, 2006). Although the Mexican government does not 
publish specifics on who is in each program to the general public, however, they still publish the 
majority of their data on how program recipients are decided. Information on how many people 
in a province receive benefits from Prospera, what criteria are evaluated to decide who belongs 
on the program, testimony from program officials during congressional hearings, and new audits 
on the program are immediately released to the public when they become available (Levy, 2006). 
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 Although the Mexican government does not publish all of their available data on program 
recipients to the general public, they do provide them to third party organizations, such as 
Transparency International, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, who 
regularly audit the program. This serves as a way for the government to limit the negative impact 
that not publishing this data to the general public could have. In addition, since these third party 
organizations specialize in examining and auditing federal programs like CCTs, they are 
arguably better equipped than the average citizen to evaluate whether or not these programs are 
properly organized. 
 Both the Mexican and Brazilian government take extensive measures to ensure that their 
conditional cash transfer programs are transparent. Despite this, however, I believe that the 
practices in place show that the Brazilian program is slightly more transparent than the Mexican 
program. Although the Mexican program has extensive monitoring from both third party 
organizations & intra-governmental organizations and allows any citizen to observe the criteria it 
uses to determine program beneficiaries, it does not allow average citizens the same access to 
data on individuals within the program that the Brazilian government does. However, due to this, 
the difference in transparency is limited to the ability of citizens to monitor other program 
beneficiaries for discrepancies. 
 This extra transparency that the Brazilian government has provided seems to have had an 
effect on decreased corruption within the program. Fieldwork done in a report compiled by 
Sugiyama and Hunter (2013), noted that citizen groups have provided information about 
suspicious activity present with certain families that were registered with the program. As a 
result, many of these families were removed from the program due to their lack of qualifications, 
and the benefits they received were given to other impoverished families who now qualified 
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because more quota space was freed. These groups were only able to conduct their investigations 
because of the fact that the Brazilian government provided information on the citizens who 
qualified and was transparent about what standards and practices were used to determine who 
qualified for the program. Groups like these assist in not only weeding out corruption within 
these programs, but also catching individuals who are lying to program officials in an attempt to 
qualify for the program, which solves some targeting errors that Brazil’s program would 
otherwise have. 
 In a way, Brazil’s increased transparency serves as a way for the program to make up for 
the way in which its overall program is decentralized. Due to the fact that information about the 
families who qualify for Bolsa Familia is collected by local officials, federal officials who are in 
charge of actually determining who qualifies are unable to ascertain whether or not the data they 
gather is valid, or may be influenced by other, local groups. Being more transparent with the data 
allows for the Brazilian government to effectively ‘decentralize’ the process of checking for 
inconsistencies within the program by passing the job down to local groups. 
 Prospera is less transparent than Bolsa Familia, but this difference is likely to due to other 
structural differences within the program rather than an attempt to make the program more or 
less corrupt. The Brazilian government publishes so much information about the recipients of 
Bolsa Familia because it wants to supplement some of the flaws that may be caused by the 
program being less centralized. Oportunidades is much more centralized and does not have this 
same problem, thus releasing this information to the public would give them a lower benefit. On 
the other hand, program leaders in charge of Oportunidades have publicly stated that they believe 
that releasing information on who is in the program could cause some impoverished families 
pause before joining the program, as some families do not wish to be publicly seen as being 
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dependent on government funds (Levy, 2006 and SEDESOL, 2008)). Thus, program leaders fear 
that, if this information was released, less families that would benefit from being on the program 
would join, which would hurt the program’s overall effectiveness. To them, a slightly higher 
chance of corruption due to a lack of transparency is outweighed by the benefits of having more 
families be willing to sign up for Opotunidades. 
 Both Mexico and Brazil have external organizations review their programs on a semi-
regular basis to check for both fraudulent abuses of the program and ways in which the program 
itself can be made more efficient. In addition, the federal governments of each country itself 
have programs which regularly run audits of their CCT programs that are designed to catch 
corruption within the program. In Brazil, the current organization in charge of running these 
audits is the Ministério da Transparência, Fiscalização e Control (English: The Ministry of 
Transparency, Supervision and Control), which was officially formed in 2016 but is a 
combination of several other former governmental bodies that have existed for long, such as the 
Comptroller General. In Mexico, the organization in charge of auditing and monitoring Prospera 
is Ministry of Social Development, or SEDESOL, although the program itself is also regularly 
monitored by the other ministries that it receives funding and information from (Ríncon, 2012). 
 In addition, the Mexican government will have other external organizations that 
specialize in certain areas evaluate the program to pick up on certain deficiencies, such as a 2015 
report by the World Bank on Prospera’s impact on poverty and a 2014 report by Proyecto de 
Protección Social en México on its impact on education rates. Currently, the Mexican 
government has hired Transparency International to conduct a report on the program’s current 
transparency measures as well the amount of corruption present in the program. It was 
announced that this report would be undertaken in 2015, but it has not been completed yet. 
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Research from this report will likely be very helpful in evaluating the impact that Prospera’s 
transparency measures have had in actually preventing corruption. 
 The Mexican government also has issues with publishing all of the external evaluations 
that have been undertaken with regards to the program. While those directly in charge of 
Oportunidades themselves have been very forward on publishing all internal and external 
evaluations related to the program that they have conducted related to the program, SEDESOL 
(the ministry in charge of Prospera) has come under criticism for censoring parts of reports that 
make Prospera and other social programs appear unflattering (Rosales, 2016). They have also 
been criticized for keeping some of the data that they use to determine where to expand or scale 
back on the program a secret. While the ministry does allow experts compiling future reports as 
well as the bureaucrats in charge of running the program to review this information, it would be 
more transparent for them to publish this data to the general public.  
 The way that the Brazilian government pays out benefits to the public also increases the 
organization’s overall transparency. Whereas the Mexican government has its benefits doled out 
directly by the program itself, the Brazilian government relies on banks to organize and then 
hand out the money given out by the program.  As mentioned before, this allows these banks to 
know who should be receiving what benefits and track their progress, which also allows them to 
quickly know if money is not being properly allocated. This allows these banks themselves to 
raise an alarm if they believe that something is wrong with the program, which adds another 
layer of transparency (Lindert et al., 2007). 
 Based on all of these factors, I believe that the Brazilian Bolsa Familia program is a bit 
more transparent than Mexico’s Prospera program. While handing out data on beneficiaries of 
the program could cause a potential problem in getting some individuals to sign on for the 
Richardson, 32 
 
program, it does add another method for individuals and organizations to check on whether any 
funds within the program are allocated properly. In addition, while both programs have exterior 
groups examine their programs for potential sources of corruption, the Mexican government 
occasionally hides reports that may be unflattering to them while the Brazilian government still 
publishes their external evaluations to the public. Finally, Brazil’s decentralized system of 
payments provides another method for an exterior group to continuously monitor the payments 
being sent out to beneficiaries. 
c. Objective Criteria For Measurement 
One of the most important things that plays into the development of conditional cash 
transfer programs is the method through which beneficiaries of the programs are determined. 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs wish to target families that are on the lower end of the 
poverty spectrum. As a result, criteria that measure these programs will be designed to measure a 
family’s income and assets. 
It can be very difficult to create an objective measure for determining total wealth and 
income. In addition to looking at factors such as the yearly income of the head(s) of household, 
one also has to examine factors such as the material wealth of the family, the income that other 
family members could be providing them, the possibility that they receive additional income 
through less than legitimate means that would not be reported, as well as the fact that some of 
these families may attempt to hide their relative wealth and income in an attempt to become a 
beneficiary of the program (Marcos & Azevedo, 2013). 
The fact that these programs have to rely on all of these variables means that measuring a 
family’s wealth can be an extremely subjective process. For example, some items may be valued 
at higher prices by some individuals more than others, values of certain material goods such as 
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property values may vary drastically over time, and the hours worked by some individuals in the 
family may be up for dispute (Lindert et al., 2007). However, even these more subjective 
measures can be limited by setting in place more objective criteria for evaluators to follow. 
In Brazil, the government uses a method of geographic targeting to determine the relative 
poverty of an area. Under this method, only a certain number of people within a region are able 
to qualify for Bolsa Familia. The amount of people in a region allowed varies from municipality 
to municipality, but the total number of families allotted for the program is approximately 11.1 
million (Lindert et al., 2013 and Hellmann, 2015). This geographic targeting is done to control 
for price differences and poverty rates within different regions. For example, since prices and 
wages in rural areas are generally much lower than prices in urban areas, people living in rural 
areas generally make less. If geographic targeting was not used to control for price, then, 
practically all program money would go to rural areas, even if there were relatively more 
impoverished families living in the city. The number of families allowed within a specific region 
is determined by local measures and estimates of poverty in the area. This is used to both set 
quotas for how many people in an area the government believes should be on the program as 
well as the level of income/wealth that a family needs to have in order to qualify for the program. 
It also allows them to update the program if national or local poverty levels change (Soares, 
2011). 
After determining the quotas for how many families in a region may qualify for the 
program, the Brazilian government uses what they refer to as ‘means-tested mechanisms’ to 
determine who qualifies for the program. 
This information is collected by local governmental officials who are associated with the 
programs. These individuals are expected to meet with program beneficiaries at least once every 
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two years for an interview about their level of wealth. These interviews are usually done in the 
home because it gives the interviewer a clearer sense of the individual’s overall income level, but 
they can also be done in other public places. Interviews not held in homes are largely done for 
logistical reasons, either because it is too expensive for the local office to visit the home of every 
beneficiary of the program or because it is more convenient for beneficiaries to interview at a 
different location (Soares, 2011). Random spot checks of the homes of those who choose not to 
interview there are used to encourage interviewees to be honest about their living situation. 
This information is augmented by data already put into Brazil’s national registry system, 
the Cadastro Unico. Data that is gathered by individuals on a local level is put into this national 
database. Not only is information that is used to determine which beneficiaries are qualified to 
receive aid for the Bolsa Familia program put here, but also information gathered by other social 
programs that these potential participants may be a part of. As result, program evaluators have an 
easier way potentially to access even more data about those participating in the program to make 
even more informed decisions (Hellmann, 2015). Although the data gathered in this program is 
done by municipal officials who are trained by the federal government, the Cadastro system 
itself is organized and run by the federal government and has been used as a way to centralize 
social programs. Municipal officials associated with the program are, however, allowed access to 
the data for assistance with gathering information about interviewees and individuals who could 
be targeted by the program (Tally and Fredholm, 2011). Prospera also uses geographic targeting 
to determine how much each region receives from the program, but does not have an easily 
accessible system like the Cadastro that other federal programs can access. 
In both Brazil and Mexico, the criteria used to determine whether or not a family 
qualifies for a CCT program are determined by the federal government. Although the amount of 
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income required for a family to qualify may vary from province to province to province, these 
differences are set at the federal level and based off of local data that the federal government 
receives (Levy, 2006 and Lindert et. al., 2011). 
I would argue that the largest difference between the way that the Mexican and Brazilian 
programs determine who qualifies for the program is that Mexico’s Prospera program uses a 
proxy-means test to determine who qualifies for the program  whereas Bolsa Familia implements 
a strictly means-tested program to determine who qualifies. This effectively means officials 
determining who qualifies for Progresa will look at a large number of assets outside of income 
that could serve as proxies for the program. This includes the type of home the family lives in, 
whether or not they own any ‘luxury’ goods such as a television, how many family members 
they are taking care of, and so on and so forth. The Brazilian test, on the other hands, focuses 
largely on the overall income of the family when compared to how many members of the 
household there are. The Brazilian test also compares income to local price levels when 
determining the total value of a family’s income (Azevedo, 2013). 
There have been several complaints about the large targeting errors that using a strictly 
means-tested program has caused. Some researchers have argued that using a strictly means-
tested option does not allow program interviewers to fully understand a family’s overall financial 
situation and oftentimes lead to people who work in the unofficial market to be completely 
ignored or allow families with members who are temporarily taking time off or looking for a job 
to be counted as poorer overall than they actually are. This results in some deserving families 
being left off of the list while slightly richer families are put on the list (Azervedo, 2013). 
The strictly means-tested method also presents another problem in the way that it collects 
data. Since information about these families are collected solely from interviews with these 
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families, beneficiaries do have the opportunity to lie about their income in order to further boost 
their chances of being on the program. This is relatively simple for some families to do, as 
program interviewers not always have access to information that would verify whether or not 
they are being completely honest about the income they are receiving (Pieri, 2014). 
It is also possible for families to lie about their overall wealth in a proxy-means test. 
Families who wish to appear poorer could hide some of their more valuable objects (such as 
jewelry or a television) in order to lower how much a program representative would say they are 
worth. However, it is much more difficult to hide all of one’s valuable assets than it is to lie 
about your income. In addition, a Propera’s proxy-means test still includes family income as a 
factor, so a family would have to lie about their total wealth no matter what. This makes the 
proxy-means test the harder one for families to fool due to the large number of variables that it 
includes (Bastagli, 2010). 
The fact that the proxy-means test is harder for families to fool does not necessarily mean 
that it will necessarily lower or raise corruption within the program, however. The way that the 
proxy-means test is designed simply means that it is more difficult for interviewees attempting to 
manipulate the program on their own will have a more difficult time doing so. Since this paper is 
looking for instances of corruption from program officials themselves, however, I cannot assume 
that these interviewees would be working alone. Rather than looking at how hard it would be for 
an individual family to influence the program, I need to examine how difficult it would be for 
program officials to influence how these criteria are reported. 
Based on studies of how these two methodologies have interacted, the results for which 
seems to have the greater impact are inconclusive. While it is harder for individuals to fool the 
proxy-means tested methodology due to the fact that it collects information, it also means that 
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the simpler design of the strictly-means tested methodology is easier to collect objective data for 
and, as a result, can be easier to collect data on systemic violations (Marcos and Azevedo, 2013). 
In addition, it is harder to say whether or not the complexity of the proxy-means tested 
methodology is harder for corrupt government officials to manipulate. Although little research 
on how these specific testing types affect corruption has been done in Latin America, data on a 
poverty allocation program in India that used a similar proxy-means test sheds some light on 
how these mechanisms may operate. Data from this study showed that during the first few years 
of the proxy-means test, results about what individuals qualify for the program seemed to 
accurately reflect actual circumstances. Over time, however, a greater number of individuals, 
including many government officials and their friends, began appearing on the rolls (Olken and 
Pande, 2012). What these results seemed to indicate was that over time, government officials 
with access to the program would get a good idea of how the formula for the proxy-means test 
operates. Once they have this information, it becomes much easier for them to manipulate data 
on specific individuals in such a way that they qualify for the program without appearing too 
suspicious. Thus, while proxy-means testing provides a short term benefit against corruption, it 
would not appear to supply significant long-term protections against corruption. 
Unfortunately, much of the data on the impacts of these proxy- and strictly- means tests 
focuses on their potential targeting errors and efficiency in selecting program beneficiaries rather 
than information on how they can be manipulated. As a result, this conclusion has partially to 
rely on data that is not focused on programs in Latin America. I believe that further study into 
the ways in which these tests could be manipulated for personal gain by individuals within the 
government would be very helpful in assessing how CCT programs could be improved in the 
future. 
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VI. Conclusion: 
Throughout this paper I have examined the ways in which Brazilian and Mexican 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs have differed from one another in how they try to prevent 
corruption within the program. In many ways, these programs follow a similar model in trying to 
prevent corruption, however, several small but important differences between them demonstrate 
ways in which the program can be run to minimize overall corruption. 
The centralization of the program seems to be the most important factor in preventing 
systemic corruption within the program. Examination within the program has demonstrated that 
the majority of corruption found within these programs occurs on a local rather than federal level 
when politicians attempt to use the program to influence voters. Comparisons between Bolsa 
Familia and Oportunidades showed that while many aspects of both programs were centralized, 
Bolsa Familia's method of data collection was fairly decentralized and very reliant on municipal 
governments. This has allowed for local officials to have both more credibility when telling 
voters that they can manipulate the program and have a greater ability actually to get themselves 
and others on the program. Thus, it appears that greater centralization of these programs leads to 
less corruption within these programs. 
This research raises interesting implications about the centralization of CCT programs. 
Some national governments and organizations have been wary about encouraging developing 
countries with more corrupt and less stable governments to have greater control over their social 
programs due to the potential struggles they could have in enforcing these programs However, 
this research indicates that giving the central government greater control over these social 
programs actually lowers the degree of corruption in them by making it more difficult for it to 
occur. This raises further questions about encouraging central governments to take on greater 
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responsibilities for programs within their countries. I would encourage more research into the 
topics of both whether maintaining control over more programs is linked to better governance 
and whether this effect is seen in other agencies other than ones that run social programs. 
 Both of these programs also had extensive measures in place to try and encourage 
transparency within the program. Both had external organizations frequently audit the program, 
although the Mexican government has had a worse track record with releasing and sourcing 
several of the audits if they contain data that could be unfavorable to the program. Prospera also 
does not release personal information about its beneficiaries, which makes it harder for 
individual citizens groups to track data on beneficiaries. While both of these are worrying signs 
and could lead to greater problems later on, I could not find significant links to show that this 
slightly lower level of transparency actually impacted corruption within the program. 
While the programs that I examined did not have many significant differences with 
respect to transparency, the fact that they had significant transparency measures already in place 
indicates a degree of commitment within the government to monitor these programs and prevent 
corruption. Based on other research in the field, it is unlikely that transparency measures have no 
effect on the level of corruption within governments and social programs. However, the fact that 
Mexico’s slightly lower level of transparency did not seem to impact the program in any 
significant measure indicates that the effectiveness of these measures may decrease the greater 
the measures there are in place. Thus, when designing future CCT programs, it may be 
reasonable to prioritize additional transparency measures behind other factors such as coverage 
and efficiency provided that some measures are already in place. 
 Finally, I examined the methods that both programs use to determine which beneficiaries 
qualify for the program. Although the proxy-means test makes it harder for individuals to lie 
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about their overall wealth and become program beneficiaries, I could not find many results to 
show that this actually prevented government officials from manipulating program results to 
select particular beneficiaries. This was particularly true since these officials would have more 
access to information about how program beneficiaries are determined. So, all in all, having 
more complicated criteria for beneficiaries does not necessarily make the program less 
susceptible to corruption. Clearly, more research needs to be done in this area in order to better 
clarify the impacts that differing evaluations of wealth and assets have on corruption within the 
program. A long term study on the amount of incorrect assessments of benefits within the 
program after standards were put into place would be particularly useful here. For now, however, 
whether or not these evaluations use a strictly- or proxy-means tested evaluation does not seem 
to affect significantly the degree of corruption within the program. 
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